Monday, October 27, 2025

Ncaa lawsuit concussion from 1970s


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202526 PAVILIA LAWSUIT GOING FOR CLASS ACTION STATUS - JUCO - NAIA WILL NOT COUNT TOWARD D1 ELIGIBILITY


Why stop at 4years of eligibility d1?

Sean McAndrews, MA
Associate AD Senior Compliance, Administration
3047664122 office
West Virginia State University
MEC CHARTER MEMBER

https://ncaad2rules.blogspot.com/


"Experience is what you get, when you don't get what you wanted" 

Randy Pausch CMU Last Lecture


Please report IT, COL and Physical Facilities issues by sending an email with complete information to the appropriate address:


WVSSAC 202526 Transfer Students change Sports in WV

Sean McAndrews, MA
Associate AD Senior Compliance, Administration
3047664122 office
West Virginia State University
MEC CHARTER MEMBER

https://ncaad2rules.blogspot.com/


"Experience is what you get, when you don't get what you wanted" 

Randy Pausch CMU Last Lecture


Please report IT, COL and Physical Facilities issues by sending an email with complete information to the appropriate address:


LOCAL OHIO HS SUSPENDED FROM PLAYOFF - Ironton 2025



Sean McAndrews, MA
Associate AD Senior Compliance, Administration
3047664122 office
West Virginia State University
MEC CHARTER MEMBER

https://ncaad2rules.blogspot.com/


"Experience is what you get, when you don't get what you wanted" 

Randy Pausch CMU Last Lecture


Please report IT, COL and Physical Facilities issues by sending an email with complete information to the appropriate address:


Friday, October 24, 2025

Fourth Circuit Holds That Uncertainty in Return to Work Date is Unreasonable Request for Indefinite Leave

Lawsuits - injured - workman's compensation - etc

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From: Steptoe & Johnson PLLC <info-steptoe-johnson.com@shared1.ccsend.com>
Date: Thu, Oct 23, 2025 at 12:01 PM
Subject: Fourth Circuit Holds That Uncertainty in Return to Work Date is Unreasonable Request for Indefinite Leave
To: <mcandrse@wvstateu.edu>


Fourth Circuit Holds That Uncertainty in Return to Work Date is Unreasonable Request for Indefinite Leave

Introduction


This past summer, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit — a federal appeals court that governs West Virginia, Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina — considered a tale as old as time: An employer, Nexstar Media, was sued by a former employee, Leanna Coffman, who was fired while out on leave. As is often the case, there was much more to this tale, requiring an untangling of rights and obligations arising under West Virginia's state antidiscrimination law (co-extensive with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). As human resources professionals know too well, navigating the panoply of overlapping and distinct responsibilities that arise under the ADA and FMLA is no easy feat. At the intersection of the ADA and FMLA is the question that often confounds employers: What happens when an employee cannot return to work after the period of 12 weeks of FMLA leave is exhausted? And if additional leave is given, how much is reasonable as an accommodation under the ADA? The Fourth Circuit addressed these questions and reaffirmed that employers do not have an obligation to provide indefinite leave as a reasonable accommodation.

 

Facts

 

Coffman served as an account executive at Nexstar. In 2021, she became pregnant with twins and was diagnosed with placenta previa, necessitating bedrest. Nexstar approved her request to work remotely during this period. On February 23, 2022, Coffman delivered twins by cesarean section and commenced a 12-week FMLA leave. During the procedure, she experienced ureter damage that required multiple surgeries and resulted in significant pain and mobility limitations. Coffman asserted that she requested remote work accommodations between mid-April and May, which was disputed by Nexstar. Coffman's FMLA leave concluded on May 17, but she continued to receive short-term disability benefits.

 

As of June 28, Nexstar had not received medical clearance for Coffman to return to work. When contacted regarding her availability, Coffman reported she was not yet able to resume work and asked Nexstar to refrain from further inquiries about her return. On August 4, Coffman notified Nexstar of a scheduled surgery on August 8, which would require four to six weeks of recovery, with the possibility of an additional procedure in October. Indeed, the best estimation Coffman could offer about her return to work date was that she would "probably" be released to work in "September or October." On August 15, following nearly six months of absence, Nexstar terminated Coffman's employment.

 

Coffman sued in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, alleging three West Virginia Human Rights Act (WVHRA) violations — failure to accommodate, discriminatory discharge, and retaliatory discharge — and one FMLA claim for retaliatory discharge. Nexstar sought summary judgment on all counts, which the District Court granted, citing Coffman's ongoing inability or unwillingness to work despite six months of leave and her failure to show any reasonable accommodation existed that would have permitted her to perform her job duties. Coffman appealed.

 

Indefinite Leave is Not a Reasonable Accommodation

 

The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the employer on all counts. In doing so, the Court first unpacked Coffman's failure to accommodate claim under the WVHRA. The Court observed that a failure to accommodate claim must be predicated on the existence of a reasonable accommodation that the employer allegedly failed to provide. Here, none of Coffman's proposed accommodations (unpaid leave, paid parental leave, and remote work) were reasonable on their face. Unpaid leave was not reasonable because Coffman had been absent for six months and could not provide an approximate return date, making it essentially a request for indefinite leave. The Fourth Circuit explained that requests for unpaid leave with no level of certainty as to whether an employee can return to work "at any point in the near future" are unreasonable accommodation requests. Importantly, the Court held that while a precise return to work date is not necessary, Coffman's inability to be more specific than "probably … September or October" was far too uncertain to be reasonable.

 

The Court also held that paid parental leave was not reasonable for the same reason and because Coffman did not qualify for the program, and remote work was not reasonable because the record demonstrated Coffman was unable to work in any capacity during her recovery.

 

Finding that no reasonable accommodation existed that would have allowed Coffman to perform her duties was the death knell to Coffman's discriminatory discharge claim under the WVHRA. Without any showing of a "reasonable accommodation" available to her, Coffman thus failed to show that she was even a "qualified individual with a disability" within the meaning of the WVHRA. Similarly, the Court made quick work of Coffman's retaliatory discharge claim on that same basis. Because the proposed accommodations discussed above were not reasonable, Coffman's requests for them were not considered "protected activity." Finally, turning to Coffman's FMLA claim, the Court was not persuaded that the three-month gap between her FMLA leave and the termination of her employment suggested any causal connection between the two.

 

Bottom Line

 

The Fourth Circuit's analysis reinforces two important principles. First, the viability of many disability claims under the ADA and related state law hinges on whether the proposed workplace accommodation is reasonable. Without a finding of reasonableness — which, of course, is always a case-by-case determination — the employee cannot prevail.

 

Second, and the more practical takeaway for employers, is that paid or unpaid leave for an indefinite period of time while an employee recovers from or receives treatment for a medical condition or disability is not a reasonable accommodation. In the Coffman case, the fact that the employee had already been on leave for six months, with another surgery and prolonged recovery potentially on the horizon, swayed the Court that the amount of leave requested was undetermined and her return to work date was far from certain.

 

Employers should take care to participate meaningfully in the interactive process to determine how much leave beyond the FMLA will be required and whether the employee can identify a return to work date with reasonable certainty. For questions, please reach out to Steptoe & Johnson's Employment Litigation Team or the author of this alert. 


Author

Shelby A. Hicks-Merinar

Of Counsel | Labor & Employment


(304) 598-8176

Click Here to Email

© 2025 Steptoe & Johnson PLLC. All Rights Reserved.

These materials are public information and have been prepared solely for educational purposes. These materials reflect only the personal views of the authors and are not individualized legal advice. It is understood that each case is fact-specific, and that the appropriate solution in any case will vary. Therefore, these materials may or may not be relevant to any particular situation. Thus, the author and Steptoe & Johnson PLLC cannot be bound either philosophically or as representatives of their various present and future clients to the comments expressed in these materials. The presentation of these materials does not establish any form of attorney-client relationship with the authors or Steptoe & Johnson PLLC. While every attempt was made to ensure that these materials are accurate, errors or omissions may be contained therein, for which any liability is disclaimed.

Steptoe & Johnson PLLC

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In case you missed it... 202526 NCAA D1 trying to change things on student athletes NIL & Title IX



---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: The Drake Group <donna@thedrakegroupeducationfund.ccsend.com>
Date: Fri, Oct 24, 2025 at 6:01 AM
Subject: In case you missed it...
To: <ncaacompliance@wvstateu.edu>


Report #7 – October 21, 2025

Word Salad, Glib Denial, and the Intention to Mislead: The Failure of NCAA Leadership


Dear Sean,

First, a definition of "word salad" and the context in which I use it is necessary. Simply put, it is the use of words or expressions that are used by a particular profession or group of people that are difficult for others to understand." Sometimes, the use of word salad is unintentional, such as a medical professional trying to explain a diagnosis with terms common among doctors but unfamiliar to patients, unaware that this familiarity with complex language is not shared by others. At other times, these terms may be used deliberately as a public relations tactic to win a political campaign where a candidate is instructed to use words favored by the audience to divert attention from a topic they oppose. It is in this latter context of deliberate misdirection that we use "word salad" to describe a troubling situation The Drake Group has been compelled to face in the interest of both accuracy and ethical integrity. Below are the three situations we have encountered over the past 12 months and expect they will continue.


1. Entering into the House v. NCAA settlement [House Settlement] under terms that violate the NCAA Constitution.

 

Over a year ago, the NCAA Board of Governors and Division I Board of Directors voted to approve the House Settlement in violation of the NCAA's constitutional provisions. For a lawsuit involving the NCAA to be settled by the Board of Governors or a division or conference, the NCAA Constitution must first be amended through a full Association membership vote to explicitly authorize the Board of Governors or a division or subdivision to approve settlements. The authority to approve the settlement of a lawsuit can only be delegated to the conferences by a vote of all D-I members. For the House Settlement, no such vote took place. Non-Power Four institutions and conferences were never consulted during settlement deliberations, and the advice of the Division I Council (which has one representative from each Division I conference) not to change the NCAA's pay-for-play prohibition was ignored.


Furthermore, the NCAA Board of Governors seems to have acted improperly violating both its Constitutional authority and the principles of the Constitution. Constitution, Art. 1 (Principles), Sec. B provides:


"The Collegiate Student-Athlete Model. Student-athletes may not be compensated by a member institution for participating in a sport but may receive educational and other benefits in accordance with guidelines established by their NCAA division."


The Board of Governors is responsible for monitoring whether divisions adhere to the principles outlined in Article I. They also have the authority to call for a vote by the entire membership on any division's action they believe conflicts with the core purposes and principles stated in the NCAA's Constitution. Such actions can be overturned by a two-thirds majority vote of those voting. However, they have never convened a special convention to do so.


2. Changing the Meaning of Revenue-Sharing and NIL Payments.


This is where the confusion starts. The implementation of the House Settlement led to the  creation of two key terms: "revenue-sharing" and "NIL payments." Revenue-sharing is a pooled fund used to support all sports programs. The term "revenue-sharing" in school sports is widely understood and legally recognized to mean that all revenues coming into the school, such as donations, ticket sales, media rights fees, sponsorships, merchandise licensing, etc., belong to the school not the athletes involved in the revenue-generating sports. The school then has the responsibility to distribute those funds (whether as cash or benefits purchased with the funds) in a way that does not discriminate by sex. The NCAA and its members have made deliberate statements claiming that these cash payments to athletes are not "pay-for-play" benefits. 95 percent of the $2.8 billion in past damages from the House Settlement will go to men's football and men's and women's basketball, with male athletes receiving 90 percent of the funds. The same distribution plan appears to be applied to the $20.5 million in injunctive relief with the amount expected to increase yearly over the next decade. The NCAA is improperly using the label "revenue-sharing" to hide its disregard for its own rule expressed in the above referenced Constitution, Art. 1 (Principles), Sec. B.


Similarly, the same trick is being used for "NIL payments." Typically, NIL payments refers to a license for the use of an individual's name, image, and likeness rights to promote or endorse goods or services offered to the public for profit. If the institution plans to give NIL payments to athletes and these payments are not to be construed as pay-for-play, then such NIL payments should align with the definition of promoting or endorsing institutional goods and services to the public for a profit. Accordingly, any license for using a current or prospective athlete's name, image, and likeness rights should serve a legitimate business purpose related to promoting or endorsing the institution or its intercollegiate athletics program. These promotional opportunities should be equally accessible to male and female athletes pursuant to Title IX and on terms comparable to those provided to non-athlete students promoting the institution or its programs, in either a co-curricular or extracurricular capacity. 


To the contrary, the NCAA is practicing "word salad" by giving athletes any amount of cash and calling it NIL payments with no definition or standard applied to NIL payments other than the following:


Each Participating Institution may provide benefits, at its discretion, to a student-athlete as long as the combined value of the new benefits (e.g., additional payments or benefits not currently permitted by NCAA rules or in amounts above those permitted under NCAA rules as of October 7, 2024) provided by or on behalf of the Participating Institution to all student-athletes at the Participating Institution does not exceed the benefits cap at any time during the academic year. –NCAA Question and Answer: Implementation of the House Settlement-June 13, 2025


In other words, an individual athlete or group of selected individuals cannot receive more than $20.5 million in total cash. One restriction does apply; the institution cannot label the payment as a "payment for the right to use a student-athlete's NIL for a broadcast of collegiate athletic games or competitive athletic events"—a dismissive denial of pay for play. NIL payments made today are straightforward recruiting or retention cash incentives that are not tied to educational expenses or purpose and are based on the institution's perception of the value of the recipients' playing ability in relation to the revenue they generate in their respective sports.


3. Glib Denial Attempts to Undermine the Application of Title IX to Revenue-Sharing and NIL Payments.


Title IX bans sex discrimination in athletic programs. Giving more money to male athletes than to female athletes, regardless of the reasons, qualifies as sex discrimination. The law itself, along with its legislative history, regulations, interpretations, and extensive case law, clearly shows there is no justification for treating men's football and men's basketball programs differently when evaluating sex discrimination. Yet, this is exactly what the proposed settlement aims to do.


Plaintiff's lawyer, Steve Berman, has even suggested that conferences may provide payments to athletes irrespective of Title IX. Accordingly, those appealing Judge Wilken's decision to approve the settlement point out that plaintiffs' attorneys improperly instructed their economic expert to ignore the application of Title IX. This attitude is concerning. While the plaintiffs' attorneys may not need to worry about the Title IX implications of the settlement and can focus mainly on the total amount of money for their clients (over 90% of whom are men) and themselves ($515 million in legal fees), everyone else in college athletics must consider the bigger picture and consequences, including compliance with Title IX. Unfortunately, NCAA President Charlie Baker, while generally emphasizing the importance of Title IX, has not provided clear leadership on how it applies to the House Settlement. Instead, he has cast doubt on its applicability to this situation despite the NCAA's position in the House case where it argued that the distribution of funds (allowing different amounts for football and men's basketball as revenue-generating sports) violated Title IX.


Furthermore, the NCAA's publicly available information about the terms of the proposed antitrust settlement does not mention how Title IX relates to its disclosed provisions such as roster and scholarship limits or athlete payments. Instead, the plaintiffs' attorneys and the defendants have said that the implications of Title IX will be addressed by future courts and Congress. News reports show that schools, conferences, and the NCAA are working to find ways to justify ignoring Title IX and to avoid providing female athletes with the same financial compensation and other benefits as male athletes. 


If the NCAA and its member institutions fail to understand the Title IX implications of the proposed antitrust settlement, they might find that resolving their antitrust issues mainly in favor of male athletes could lead to liability under Title IX. They are likely to face new problems, legal challenges, and financial burdens. Therefore, we continue working to prevent these unethical efforts from misleading others.

_______________


We need your help—please consider becoming a member. We hope you will support our efforts to ensure that any bill reaching the floor of Congress does not mislead the public about revenue-sharing or NIL payments and clearly states the application of Title IX to all benefits provided to college athletes. We are a 100 percent volunteer 501(c)(4) nonprofit organization funded by membership dues and contributions from friends and supporters. If you are not already a member or contributor, we invite you to consider joining us.


Gratefully,


Kassandra


Kassandra Ramsey, Esq.

President


Become a Member/Supporter Here
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Thank you for your support. Together, we can make a difference.


The Drake Group is a 501(c)(4) non-profit organization working to better educate the U.S. Congress and higher education policy-makers about critical issues in intercollegiate athletics for the purpose of ensuring that the promise of college athletics is realized for all stakeholders. Visit The Drake Group web site to volunteer or support our Congressional advocacy work.

The Drake Group | 8 Wright Street Suite 107 | Westport, CT 06880 US

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Kentucky Institutions Should Prepare to Update Guidelines for Undocumented Students Following DOJ Settlement



---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Steptoe & Johnson PLLC <info-steptoe-johnson.com@shared1.ccsend.com>
Date: Fri, Oct 24, 2025 at 10:30 AM
Subject: Kentucky Institutions Should Prepare to Update Guidelines for Undocumented Students Following DOJ Settlement
To: <mcandrse@wvstateu.edu>


Kentucky Institutions Should Prepare to Update Guidelines for Undocumented Students Following DOJ Settlement

Details

The Kentucky Council on Postsecondary Education (CPE) has reached a tentative settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) that would end the state's policy of granting in-state tuition to students who are undocumented immigrants and graduated from high school in Kentucky. The DOJ filed suit in June, arguing that the Kentucky regulation unlawfully gave noncitizens financial benefits that are not equally available to U.S. citizens residing in other states. Under the proposed agreement, CPE has acknowledged that the Kentucky regulation is preempted by federal law and is therefore invalid. The settlement is not yet final and requires approval by U.S. District Judge Gregory Van Tatenhove.


Kentucky's policy, which treated all state high school graduates as residents for tuition purposes regardless of citizenship, had been in place for several years. State Attorney General Russell Coleman supported the DOJ's position, warning that federal law preempts the practice and urging CPE to withdraw the rule rather than engage in costly litigation. Advocacy groups such as the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund have sought to intervene on behalf of affected students, though their request remains pending.


This lawsuit is part of a broader enforcement strategy under the Trump administration, which has sought to limit state-level benefits for undocumented immigrants through executive orders and litigation. If approved, Kentucky would become the third state this year to roll back tuition benefits for undocumented students following federal challenges. Earlier this year, Texas agreed to dismantle its long-standing policy that permitted in-state tuition for undocumented students in response to a similar lawsuit, and Florida lawmakers reversed a decade-old law that allowed in-state tuition for undocumented students. The DOJ has also targeted Minnesota and Illinois in similar suits, which are currently pending.


The settlement, if finalized, will raise the cost of college for undocumented students in Kentucky, who would be reclassified at out-of-state tuition rates, regardless of where they attended high school. Institutions should prepare to update residency determinations, adjust financial aid communications, and advise impacted students once the settlement receives final court approval.

If you have any questions or need support navigating this change, please contact the authors or Steptoe & Johnson's Higher Education team for tailored advice.

Authors

Nelva J. Smith

Member | Labor & Employment


(614) 456-1656

Click Here to Email

Ryan G. Stevens

Associate | Litigation


(502) 423-2020

Click Here to Email

© 2025 Steptoe & Johnson PLLC. All Rights Reserved.

These materials are public information and have been prepared solely for educational purposes. These materials reflect only the personal views of the authors and are not individualized legal advice. It is understood that each case is fact-specific, and that the appropriate solution in any case will vary. Therefore, these materials may or may not be relevant to any particular situation. Thus, the author and Steptoe & Johnson PLLC cannot be bound either philosophically or as representatives of their various present and future clients to the comments expressed in these materials. The presentation of these materials does not establish any form of attorney-client relationship with the authors or Steptoe & Johnson PLLC. While every attempt was made to ensure that these materials are accurate, errors or omissions may be contained therein, for which any liability is disclaimed.

Steptoe & Johnson PLLC

Steptoe & Johnson PLLC | 400 White Oaks Boulevard | Bridgeport, WV 26330 US

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